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This paper reviews the evidence on the importance of finance for economic well-being, provides 
data on the degree of usage of basic financial services by households and firms across a sample of 
countries, assesses the desirability of more universal access, and overviews the macro-economic, 
legal and regulatory obstacles to access using general evidence and case studies. Although access 
to finance can be very beneficial, the data show that universal usage is far from prevalent in many 
countries, especially developing countries.  At the same time, universal access has generally not 
been a public policy objective and is surely not easily achievable in most countries.  Countries 
can, however, undertake many actions to facilitate access to financial services, including through 
strengthening their institutional infrastructures, liberalizing and opening up their markets and 
facilitating greater competition, and encouraging innovative use of know-how and technology.  
Government attempts and interventions to directly broaden the provision of access to finance, 
however, are fraught with risks and costs, among others, the risk of missing the targeted groups.  
The paper concludes with possible global actions aimed at improving data on access and usage 
and areas of further analysis to help identify the constraints to broadening access. 
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d  2 
Introduction 
 
Finance has been shown to matter for countries’ economic development.  There is much 
evidence today for a strong and causal relationship between the depth of the financial 
system (as measured, for example, by the supply of private credit, stock market 
capitalization or other financial measures relative to GDP) on one hand and investment, 
growth, poverty, total factor productivity, etc. on the other hand.  Indeed, by many 
empirical cross-country tests, initial financial development is one of the few robust 
determinants of the subsequent growth of countries.  Finance matters for the well being 
of people beyond overall economic growth: finance can help individuals smooth income, 
insure against risks, and broaden investment opportunities. Finance can be particularly 
important for the poor and indeed recent evidence has shown that a more developed 
financial system can help reduce poverty and income inequality. 
 
Much of this evidence has however, focused attention on the importance of overall 
financial development.  Yet, and especially in many developing countries, the financial 
system at large does not cater to the needs of all customers.  Banking systems and capital 
markets are often skewed towards those already better off, catering mainly to large 
enterprises and wealthier individuals.  Often, many segments of the enterprise and 
household sector suffer from lack of access to finance, hindering their growth and 
welfare.  This raises the question whether more general availability of financial services 
should be a public sector goal and, if so, what the best means of achieving this are.   
 
This paper reviews the evidence on the importance of financial development f or 
economic well-being, provides data on the degree of usage of and access to financial 
services across a sample of countries, provides an assessment of desirability of more 
universal access to financial services, overviews the macro-economic, legal and 
regulatory obstacles to access to financial services, and reviews the risks and costs 
associated with attempts to broader the provision of access to finance. The paper is 
structured around the following topics: Why the attention on access recently? What does 
access to finance mean? What evidence is there on access and who has or does not have   3 
access? What do we know on what constraints access and what can be done by 
governments to improve access? And what are possible international actions? 
 
Access to finance: relevance  
 
Access to financial services has received more attention lately and has become a more 
important part of the overall development agenda.  This is likely for a number of reasons.  
For one, evidence that “finance”￿as in financial development￿matters for growth has 
been accumulating over the last decade.  Second, based on changes in economies and 
economic production, finance may have moved up in the ranking of barriers to growth. 
Third, there is an increasing perception that access to finance has  been skewed for 
households and enterprises. We review briefly the evidence on these three aspects.   
 
There is much more evidence today that finance causes growth.  The empirical evidence 
is very robust and available at the level of country, sector and individual firm and 
households and using various statistical techniques.  Financial deepening has been shown 
to “cause” growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; 
Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; for an extensive review of this evidence, see Levine 
2005.)  The channels why finance matters are multiple.  Finance helps growth through 
raising and pooling funds, thereby allowing more and more risky investments to be 
undertaken, by allocating resources to their most productive use, by monitoring the usage 
of funds, and by providing instruments for risk mitigation. Interesting, it is less the form 
in which these services come￿whether from banks or capital markets￿but more the fact 
that they are being provided in an efficient manner, i.e., being supported by a proper 
institutional and competitive environment, which matters for growth (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2000; see also World Bank 2001).  As such, it is difficult to assert that particular 
types of financial systems are more or less conducive to growth, and possibly neither 
which type of system is more or less conducive to facilitate access to financial services. 
 
Finance also helps with improving income distribution and poverty reduction through 
several channels. Foremost, finance helps through economic growth, thus raising overall   4 
income levels. Finance can more specifically help by distributing opportunities fairer. 
There is evidence that finance matters especially for poor households and smaller firms. 
Cross-country studies on the link between finance and poverty include Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine 2004a.  Controlling for reverse causality, they find that financial 
development causes less income inequality. Clarke, Xu, Zou, 2002 also find that 
inequality decreases as finance develops, and, since the more concentrated income the 
higher poverty, finance thus helps reduce poverty.   
 
Honohan (2004a and 2004b) specifically shows that financial depth explains poverty 
(number of people with income less than $1 or $2 a day). But, he also finds that across 
countries the degree of microfinance penetration, often thought to be specifically useful 
for the poor, has no special effects on poverty (see, however, Morduch and Hayley, 
2002).  Specific ways in which financial sector development has been found to help 
reduce poverty is by alleviating credit constraints that reduce child labor and increase 
education, including the opportunity cost of foregone child labor services, and by 
insuring against shocks (see Morduch, 2003 for the important of micro-insurance for 
poverty). More generally, with one or two exceptions, it is arguably that direct access of 
poor people to financial services can strongly affect the attainability of each of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
1, including those that chiefly require upgrading 
of public services in health and education, etc, as these also require poor households to be 
able to afford these services, which in turn is facilitated by their access to finance 
 
Second, as economic production is changing and countries are liberalizing their real 
economies, it has become clearer that the degree of financial development importantly 
influences the ability of countries, firms and individuals to make use of (new) growth 
opportunities. The fact that finance matters for firms’ growth opportunities is especially 
so for SMEs.  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004b show that, while large SME 
sectors are characteristic of successful economies, SMEs do not “cause” growth, nor do 
SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality.  Rather they show that the overall 
business environment￿ease of firm entry and exit, sound property rights, and proper 
                                                 
1 See IMF/World Bank 2004 on the MDG and progress in achieving them.   5 
contract enforcement￿influences economic growth. Finance, however, accelerates 
growth by removing constraints on small firms, more so than on large firms.  Finance 
allows firms to operate on a larger scale and encourages more efficient asset allocation. 
Financial￿and institutional￿development thus help leveling the playing field among 
firms and countries, especially important in a global economy with rapidly changing 
growth opportunities.  
 
Third, while financial development in general is beneficial for growth and poverty, this 
does not mean that finance is available on an equal basis.  Finance can be allocated 
skewed or even perversely.  W hile hard to “proof” for a large sample of countries, 
increasingly there is evidence that finance often benefits the few, especially in developing 
countries.  In normal times, this has meant that not all have been given a fair chance at 
getting their projects financed.  Loans are being allocated on the basis of connections and 
non-market criteria.  In the context of crises, this has meant that the costs of financial 
crises have been allocated unevenly, with the brunt borne by the poor. Halac and 
Schmukler (2003) show that financial transfers during crises are large and expected to 
increase income inequality and to be very regressive.  For more discussion of the uneven 
distribution of finance and the impact of financial reform on inequality, see Claessens and 
Perotti (2005) and references therein.    
 
These three aspects already suggest that there may be a case for making financial services 
more generally available.  We need to analyze though what access to finance means, what 
the data show, what the impediments to access are, how access can be improved, and 
whether there is a residual role of the government in encouraging greater and more equal 
access.  
   6 
What does access to financial services mean and what do the data tell us on usage of 
and access to finance? 
 
To analyze the issues of access, we first need a definition what access to finance means.  
There are v arious dimensions to access to financial services (see Bodie and Merton, 
1995, for a general review of the functions of finance).  First, is the question of 
availability: are financial services available and in what quantity?  Second is the question 
of cost: at what price are financial services available, including all costs, also the 
opportunity costs of say of having to wait in line for a teller or having to travel a long 
distance to a bank branch?  Third, what are the range, type and quality of financial 
services being offered?  Following Morduch (1999), we can name these dimensions 
differently as reliability, i.e., is finance available when needed/desired; convenience, i.e., 
what is the ease of access; continuity, i.e., can finance be accessed repeatedly; and 
flexibility, i.e., is the product tailored to the needs. There are other variants of dimensions 
of finance used in other studies.
2  The point is that there are various dimensions to access, 
making it more difficult to establish the degree of (lack) of access. 
 
This discussion already shows that there will not be an easy definition of access. One also 
needs a clear objective of what is the desirable degree of access.  Universal access is not 
necessarily the goal, different perhaps from basic health services, primary education, 
clean water, etc.  There are number of reasons.  For one, we do not (yet) know at the 
micro-level sufficiently well what the benefits and impacts of access to finance are and 
whether there is a public goods argument to be made in favor of extending access more 
broadly.  The gains of access to basic health care services such as immunization are better 
known today than the gains from access to financial services.  Second, as for other good 
and services, the demand for financial services may not exist.  Many households even in 
developed countries choose not have a bank account as they do not engage in enough 
financial transactions, e.g., write no checks, collect wages in cash or cash their checks, 
                                                 
2 For example, Kempson et al. 2000 distinguish between five types of exclusion to financial services: 
(i) access exclusion: e.g. through risk screening;  (ii) condition exclusion: product design inappropriate for 
the needs of some people; (iii) price exclusion: financial products too costly; (iv) marketing exclusion: with 
some people effectively excluded by targeting marketing and sales; (v) self-exclusion: some persons not 
applying in the belief that they would be refused.    7 
yet they may not burdened by no “access.”  Firms without use of external credit may 
choose to remain so as their rates of return on capital are too low to justify formal finance 
or because they are not willing to provide the necessary information on their business to 
banks, and by implications to others, including tax authorities.  Equally important, and 
even in the best financial systems financial services providers may not wish to provide 
access to all costumers as it is not profitable or sustainable to so.  This does not reflect 
any market failures, but rather that finance, like other services, has its own demand and 
supply.  This may mean that a country requires a certain overall level of development 
before more universal access is a viable proposition.   Furthermore, there is plenty 
anecdotal evidence that some households may have difficulty managing access to credit 
(e.g., credit cards), suggesting that some restraint, say until financial literacy is more 
adequate, may well be overall welfare enhancing.   
 
In order to answer whether there is a case for more universal provision of financial 
services, we need thus to know more on the benefits of access, the reasons why 
households and firms  may (or may not) demand financial services and why financial 
services provides may (or may not) provide financial services, and, of course, the costs to 
society of providing greater access.  Here, we face a number of questions, starting with 
the basic one that we have limited data across countries on the degree of usage of and 
access to financial services.  While there is much data on financial sector development, 
there is very limited data on usage and access, both for households and for firms.
 3  There 
is consequently also limited analysis on the dimensions in which access may be deficient.  
There can be deficient access geographically to branches and outlets.  Or access can 
socio-economically be deficient, i.e., access is available only for some population 
segments.  Or it can be deficient in an opportunity sense: the deserving do not have 
access.  Data are insufficient in all respects, so far, making judgments on the relative 
benefits and costs of access difficult. 
 
For some countries, there are data on households’ use of basic financial services, such as 
having a bank account, often obtained using commercial banks and central bank data, or 
                                                 
3 See Honohan 2004c and DFID 2005 on data availability and deficiencies   8 
on the basis of surveys.  More recently, data have been collected on the spread of micro-
finance following CGAP efforts and Microcredit Summit.  These cover the number of 
people with access to a savings account. For some countries, there are data from 
household surveys, such as the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS)-type.  Of 
these LSMS-surveys, some 27 have covered some dimensions of households’ use of 
financial services (see Honohan, 2004c).  Still, and with the exceptions of some 
developed countries such as Sweden, much of the data collected in these general 
households surveys is very basic and limited in terms of the various dimensions of use 
and access (quantity, costs, quality). Access by households to credit, although typically 
only one-quarter in terms of number of access to savings and arguably less important in 
terms of growth and development, has been equally difficult to document at the level of 
households.  Many countries, for example, do not even have data on the aggregate level 
of consumer credit, in part, as not just banks are providing that, but also non-bank 
financial institutions. 
 
Data on firms’ u se and access to financial services are equally limited.  While there is 
much information on listed firms’ financial structure and their access to (some forms of) 
external financing, there is much less information on the unlisted firms and especially 
limited information on small firm finance access.  Mostly data come from surveys, such 
as those conducted by the World Bank (World Bank Economic Survey￿WBES, 
Investment Climate Assessments￿ICAs), or by national agencies such as the US Federal 
Reserve Boards, UK Bank of England, EU, etc.  Some data come from central bank 
statistics and advocacy groups (e.g., US Small Business Administration, chambers of 
commerce, and equivalents).  Again, the data are basic and limited in terms of various 
dimensions of access (quantity, costs, quality). Access to credit dominates the data 
collection efforts, with access to savings services less of an issue, although payment 
services are important as well for firms. Mostly data are collected on use of and access to 
banking services, and much less data are available on other financial services, such as 
insurance, leasing, factoring and the like.  
   9 
Although weak and often not comparable, available data show that access of households 
to banking services varies greatly. In developing countries, many households do not have 
a bank account.  Table 1 provides data on the degree to which households use a basic 
financial service provided by a formal financial institution, e.g., have a checking or 
savings bank account, across a number of countries.
4  It shows that usage in most of the 
OECD countries is nearly universal, with many percentages above 95% and with an 
average of 90%; in developing countries, though, usage is much less and the average is 
only 26%. The highest usage of financial services from formal financial institutions is 
59% percent in Jamaica.  Some other high numbers may not be representative of the 
whole country as they apply to the population of the capital city only (Mexico) or some 
specific cities or regions (China, Colombia, India) or urban areas (Brazil).  For most of 
the other developing countries, use of a basic bank account does not exceed 30 percent, 
and in the lowest-income countries, use is less than 10% of households.   
 
Individuals obtain financial services through other means, though, including through non-
financial institutions, as the comparison for some Latin American countries shows (Table 
2).  The Microcredit data also show that there is often use of other forms of financial 
services, outside the banking system.  As such, these numbers underestimate the degree 
of access to financial services, but they do show the large differences between developed 
and developing countries in terms of usage of financial services from formal financial 
institutions.  
 
The next question then is who are then the unbanked households, and how do they differ, 
if at all, between developed and developing countries?  To the extent we know, the 
                                                 
4 The data for Table 1 come from a variety of sources.  The main sources are households’ surveys, the 
LSMS (Living Standard Measurement Surveys). Here individual households responses on questions of 
usage of financial services are averaged for each country.  Second main sources are the surveys conducted 
by FINMARK and genesis in a number of Southern African countries.  Again, these are household surveys, 
but more specifically aimed at usage of financial services. The source for the EU-countries is Pesaresi and 
Pilley, 2003.  For the US, the source is the Survey of Consumer Finance, 2004. For Brazil, Colombia, India 
and Mexico the recent estimates are from Kumar et al. 2004, Basu et al. 2004, and Solo et al. 2004.  The 
earlier India numbers are from the regular Indian household survey. The Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
estimates are from Peachey and Roe, 2004.  Questions on financial services usage do vary across the 
households survey, numbers are thus not necessarily comparable and some of the numbers are only rough 
estimates.   10 
profiles are as expected, although we have to realize that it is choice of households, so we 
observe only revealed usage and not potential access (given costs, quality, ease, etc., 
many do not bother to seek access from formal financial institutions).  Socioeconomic 
characteristics such as income, wealth and education play the largest roles in explaining 
access. Financial exclusion is thus often part of a broader exclusion in terms of education, 
jobs, formal training, etc. Households that use credit have a different profile from those 
with banking account and savings use, and the profile is more affected by income and 
wealth characteristics, as it tends to be the richer that borrow. 
 
The comparison between the US and Latin America countries indeed shows some 
similarities between otherwise very different countries in terms of why people do not 
(want to) bank (Table 3).  Conveniences, trust and savings are important considerations 
for households to seek financial services from banks.  Unbanked households in the US 
and Mexico also display very similar characteristics, two countries otherwise at different 
levels of development, with the exception of home ownership (Table 4).  The costs of 
being unbanked do vary considerably, however, as the alternative means are much fewer 
and more costly in Mexico. The costs in the USA for being unbanked are estimated to be 
only 2.5% of median income in the lowest income segment, whereas in Mexico they are  
estimated at 5% (Solo et al. 2004).   
   
Although also weak and often neither comparable, some data on firm access to financing 
have more recently become available.  Specifically, Table 5 reports the percentages of 
firms that say access to financing presents major or severe obstacles to the operation and 
growth of their business.  The data come from the World Bank Investment Climate 
Assessments (ICA) that have been conducted in the last few years.  About a quarter of the 
firms on average complain about the lack of external financing, with large variations 
though, from less than seven percent for Latvia and Lithuania, to more than 50 percent 
for several countries and a high of 60 percent for Brazil.   
 
Somewhat similar to the households’ analysis is the answer to the question what are the 
unbanked firms? To the extent we know, profiles are as expected, with size of the firm   11 
(and related, age) especially important.  Table 5 already suggests this since the 
percentage of large firms with complaints is less than that for the smallest firms, on 
average some eight-percentage points, but sometimes as much as 10 to 20 percentage 
points.  Across a large sample of countries and controlling for other factors, it has also 
been found that size strongest affects access to credit (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2005).  (This analysis used the World Bank Economic Survey data; the 
ICA-data are currently being analyzed to further determine what drives (lack of) firm 
access across countries.)  For a specific country, Brazil,  size was found to be more 
important than performance and other variables, suggesting quantitative limitations to 
credit access (Francisco and Kumar, 2004).  The impact of size on credit was found to be 
greater for longer-term loans in case of Brazil (as well as for many other countries). As 
an aside, public financial institutions in Brazil are actually found more likely to lend to 
large firms, thus negating the idea that public banks necessary fill market gaps.    
 
Size may, however, reflect not only profitability, financial and legal collateral but also 
political collateral. This is particularly so in developing countries where lending is often 
done on the basis of relationship and connections, often political.  Indeed, in countries 
with well-developed financial systems size can be overcome. Many banks in developed 
countries lend to many small, single proprietary firms, sometimes without requiring 
collateral, financial statements, or other requirements. Thanks due to the spread of 
technological advances such as automated credit scoring, banks in developing countries 
are also becoming active in these forms of financing.  And in the most developed 
financial markets, universal access to basic financial services, including some forms of 
credit, is essentially assured for households, as the data above showed.   
 
Access can thus be based on opportunities and needs. Since in many countries it does not 
seem so, the question to ask is what constrains access in general and in some countries in 
particular? In other words, before asking whether there is a need for intervention, one 
needs to address the question what the barriers to access are, and whether there is a 
market failure and, if so, which.   
   12 
Financial institutions’ specific and institutional environment barriers to access 
 
Explanations of the lack of access fall into two dimensions: financial institutions’ specific 
constraints, and barriers arising from the overall institutional environment.  In the 
terminology of Beck and de la Torre (2005), this means one can classify options to 
expand access in two groups: individual financial institutions’ solutions, or what they call 
moving towards the country’s access possibilities frontier; and government actions, or 
what they call expanding the country’s access possibilities frontier.  We will first discus 
these two aspects and evidence on them and then consider the associated policy actions. 
 
Individual financial institutions’ constraints. Consumers￿households and firms￿often 
state that they restrain their demand because not the right types of financial services are 
being provided.  Households often mention  problems of high minimum deposits, and 
high administrative burden and fees. Getting a loan can be especially cumbersome and 
too costly for many a borrower given the small amounts desired, the high fixed costs of 
applying, and the often-high rejection rates. Financial institutions may furthermore 
demand collateral, which poor borrowers typically lack.  Formal financial services 
provision may also entail other, non-pecuniary barriers, such as requiring (greater) 
literacy.  Instead, households and firms will not seek financial services from formal 
financial institutions and rely on informal forms of finance. This applies to deposit, 
lending and payment services.  Individuals needed funds for investment may rely on 
family and friends.  People wanting to transmit payments to the relatives, whether 
domestic or international, may rely on informal networks, although at higher costs.  This 
is most obvious in the transmission of international remittances, where unit costs can be 
very high when more informal mechanisms are used. A $100 wire from New York to 
Mexico costs for the banked - $9 plus unknown exchange rate spread, whereas it costs for 
the unbanked - $19 plus unknown exchange rate spread (Solo, Caskey, and Durán, 2004).  
Yet, these informal mechanisms are often preferred due other, non-pecuniary barriers. 
 
Thus, lack of demand is a very important reason why usage is not universal: many 
households and firms may not use financial services, although they do have access to   13 
some financial services.  And banks may consider some households and firms as less 
attractive as customers, and are therefore not be willing to extend financial services.  
When demand is there, though, and the environment is sufficiently competitive, banks 
can be expected to try to provide financial services. Still, one common reaction of 
financial services providers why they do not serve poor households and small firms is 
that these are too high-risk, too high-cost propositions.  In other words, financial 
institutions find it not profitable enough to offer appropriate financial services to some 
segments. 
 
There may be variety of reasons for the l ack of provision of appropriate products and 
services.  Banks may have problems providing financial services to all households and 
firms given population density, e.g., it may be too costly to provide the physical 
infrastructure in rural areas.  Or in some areas there may be a lack of security in cash 
transfers and branches cannot be operated commercially profitable.  High transactions 
costs for small volumes are often mentioned as constraining financial services providers 
from broadening access. Small borrowers borrow frequently, for example, and repay in 
small installments. They consequently do not want financial products with high per unit 
costs, yet for the bank costs are often similar regardless of transaction size.  Households 
and firms in developing countries may seek financing or insurance for specific purposes 
(major life events such as marriage, health or specific crop insurance), for which 
contracts are difficult to design.  Firms may be underserved for the same reasons.  Small 
firms seek different products than large enterprises, e.g., payments services for small 
amounts, and banks may therefore not consider these firms sufficiently attractive as 
clients.  Small markets may make it more difficult to develop or roll out new products 
specifically useful for that market. 
 
For financial services providers, the fixed costs in financial intermediation thus make 
providing services for small clients, by small institutions, and in small markets hard.  At 
the same time, economies of scale lead to decreasing unit costs as transaction volume 
increases, making some specialization attractive.  While better cost management can 
lower unit cost and thereby lead to higher outreach for low-income clientele, there are   14 
limits to cost management at the level  of an individual institution, as evidence on 
economies of scale for banks in mature financial markets shows (see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997 for a survey).  Evidence on micro-finance institutions also shows this 
(Honohan, 2004b). The proliferation of micro-finance institutions in many countries has 
not necessarily benefited final clients as much as possible as few institutions have 
reached the scale necessary for efficient financial services provision.  Similar constraints 
arise at the country-level where many financial systems are very small (less than a few 
billion dollars, which is less than a very small bank in most developed countries), 
hindering effective financial services provision (Hanson, Honohan and Majnoni, 2003).  
It suggests that the scale for effective financial services provision may not exist in all 
countries. 
 
Banks can innovate though and move closer to the “access frontier”.  Sometimes prodded 
by government and public opinion, they can make their products more suited to low-
income households. In South Africa, the country's major banks launched in November 
2004 a low-cost bank account aimed at extending banking to the black majority.  The 
country's four big retail banks along with the post office's Postbank launched the 
"Mzansi" account. The account, set up under a financial sector charter agreed on by the 
industry in 2003, requires a minimum deposit of 20 rand (some 4 US dollars) and is 
aimed at providing some 13 million low-income South Africans without prior access to 
bank accounts access to financial services.  Whether this will be profitable and 
sustainable is to be seen, but the initial take-up has been promising (see further Napier, 
2005 for an analysis of access to financial services in South Africa).
   For further 
examples of innovate approaches see De la Torre and Schmukler (2005), which study 
different cases studies on enhancing access, also to investigate what may be replicable. 
 
Institutional environment constraints. For many of the mismatches between potential 
demand and supply, it is not clear if there is a market failure and if so what the exact 
source of the market failure is. Why would financial institutions not offer these products 
if feasible?  Or why would financial institutions that operate at the right scale and with 
the right technology not enter into certain markets? The fact that they do not must mean   15 
that it is not profitable to do so given current technology and the institutional 
environment (legal, regulations and other requirements) they face in a particular market.  
Question is whether these mismatches between demand and supply need to and can be 
remedied.  While there is much (relevant)  analysis on what affects financial sector 
development and the role of the institutional environment there in (e.g., World Bank, 
2001), evidence on what is affecting households’ and firms’ access to financial services 
across countries is very limited to date.  What exists though gives some insights on what 
the most binding constraints are. 
 
Across countries, it appears that access to micro-finance for poor or the near-poor is less 
in countries with higher GDP per capita, in countries with better “institutional” quality 
and a larger market size (Honohan, 2004a and 2004b).  This suggests that there is some 
element of the overall general development, including a greater usage of advanced 
technology, allowing more developed countries to offer financial services profitably to 
lower segments.  Of course, the lower segment in these more developed countries 
represents a higher income level, so it does not mean that the same technology can also 
reach the lower segments in developing countries.  The same analysis shows that the 
quality of the main banking system discourages the spread of micro-finance institutions.  
Specifically, countries with higher spreads and higher profitability in their main banking 
system have fewer micro-finance institutions. This suggests that more competition in 
banking system can foster greater access to financial services from micro-finance 
institutions.   
 
It also appears that access to savings can be a function of the distribution networks, 
including that of postal, saving banks and other more specialized financial institutions.  In 
Brazil, for example, the size and scope of the some branch networks, as well as the split 
between public/private banks and domestic/foreign banks plays a role in the degree of 
access (Kumar et al. 2004; and World Bank 2005).  In other markets, more specialized 
financial institutions such as savings banks and other proximity banks that have, besides 
profitability, an objective of providing financial services, have had some impacts on 
broadening access (Peachy and Roe, 2004).  These findings suggest that what is driving   16 
households access is not purely a function of the scope for profitable banking, but that the 
overall institutional environment and level of development do play a role.   
 
The access of small firms across countries has been analyzed more to date, and evidence 
here suggests even stronger than for households that the institutional environment matters 
(Berger and Udell, 2004 for a review of the conceptual issues).  This is particularly so on 
the credit side, as can be expected.  The absence of credit information, difficulty in 
collateral that can be registered and recovered if necessary, difficulties in general contract 
design and enforcement can make lending especially difficult.  Credit services may 
consequently be limited to entrepreneurs with credit history, (political) connections, or 
immovable collateral, such as real estate collateral.  Even when a business is viable, there 
will often be a lack of formal reliance on past records and little regard to expected future 
performance.  In many countries, there is often the additional problem of uncertain 
repayment capacity arising from volatile income and expenditures. Especially new and 
smaller firms often have high exposures to these systemic risks (e.g., macro-economic 
volatility, financial crises, default by governments, arbitrary taxation and other risks).   
 
There is empirical evidence on the importance of these barriers.  The quality of legal 
systems, property rights, and the presence of mechanisms for reliable information have 
been found to be especially important for small firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2005).  Small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less 
external finance, especially less bank finance.  Better protection of property rights 
increases external financing of small firms significantly more than that of large firms, 
mainly due to more bank and equity finance.  It also appears that substitutes to bank 
finance are imperfect, e.g., small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or 
trade finance compared to larger firms.
5 
 
Analysis at the individual country level has been more limited to date, but it does provide 
some insights as well in what may be driving access.  It is clear that banking system 
                                                 
5 See further some of the papers presented at a recent World Bank SME-conference, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/sme_conference.htm.   17 
regulations can hinder access.  There can be minimum or maximum  interest rates 
policies, which make it hard for financial services providers to offer saving or lending 
instruments profitable.  Other regulations can include usury laws, restrictions and 
requirements on lending, and high compliance costs.  High transactions costs and barriers 
for dealing with formal financial institutions for households can be due to administrative 
regulations and procedures.  The procedures for a household opening a bank account can 
be complex, requiring among others proof of identity, address, or income.  Many 
countries, for example, have costumer identification requirements, so called “Know Your 
Customer” rules, which limit their ability to offer simple banking products.  The recent 
focus on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorisms financing (AML/CFT) has led to 
laws that can adversely affect the provision of financial services, as it has threaten to do 
in South Africa (see Mapier, 2005).  In some countries there are other, costly or distortive 
rules (e.g., in some African countries where permission from the male household head is 
necessary for the female member of the household to open a bank account). More 
generally, government interference can distort risk-return signals, making it hard for 
formal financial institutions to offer attractive products.   
 
In addition to hindering the activity of existing financial services providers, regulations 
can also hinder the emergence of financial institutions more suited to the needs of lower-
income households or smaller firms.  Rigidity in chartering rules, (high) minimum capital 
adequacy requirements (in absolute terms), limited degrees in funding structures, too 
heavy regulations and supervision, too strict accounting requirements and other rules can 
hinder micro-finance institutions and smaller financial institutions from emerging.  In 
South Africa, regulation and supervision for banks was being extended to micro-finance 
institutions, which reduced their capacity to offer financial services profitable to the 
lower segments of the populations (Glaessner et al. 2004).   Separate charters may be 
useful, with the structures required depending, among others, on whether the institution 
borrows, takes deposits, is owned by its members and only caters to those (Van 
Greuning, Gallardo, and Randhawa, 1999).   
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With these and other regulatory and supervisory requirements tradeoffs arise, however, as 
the requirements are meant to serve other public policy purposes, such as financial 
stability and financial integrity.  There are also tradeoffs in terms of facilitating the 
mainstreaming of micro-finance institutions.  Jansson, Rosales and Westley (2004) argue, 
for example, that one does not want to create new and distinct institutional forms for 
microfinance unless: (a) there are several mature and well-managed nonprofit 
organizations ready to transform into such financial intermediaries, and (b) the existing 
institutional forms— such as bank or finance company—are for all practical purposes 
unusable (due to high minimum capital requirements, for instance) or carry important 
operational restrictions (such as the inability to mobilize deposits).   
 
There is consequently a need to evaluate the value of regulatory approaches from an 
overall welfare point of view.  Although approaches have to strike the right balance, they 
can be adjusted to further enhance access.  In many countries, for example, one needs to 
develop anti-predatory lending rather than usury laws which in the end hurt the small 
borrowers as they do not get access to credit at all, even at high interest rates. Also 
adopting “truth in lending” requirements to small scale lending, rather than the extensive 
small print type regulations many countries have, can be useful to ease access. Adapting 
regulations can furthermore mean facilitating multiple forms of financial services 
provision, e.g., not just “banks” that takes deposits.  In many cases, it will involve 
considering savings mobilization separately from credit extensions.  Many households 
are interested in savings and payments services only, not in credit services.  It can be that 
these types of financial services provision require different forms of regulation and 
supervision.  This mean, one might develop specific frameworks for micro-finance 
institutions and activities of commercial banks on small scale.  
 
Finally, much of regulation is aimed at protecting savers and borrowers against misuse 
and risks, yet they may not be effective in developing countries given lack of supervisory 
capacity, independence and effective checks and balances while still ending up hindering 
access (see Barth, Caprio and Levine 2005).  Consideration also needs to be given to 
educate people on the risks of (new) financial services and different types of financial   19 
services providers, such they themselves strike the right balance between risk and 
benefits. More generally, it will be necessary to increase financial literacy, as is actively 
being done in some countries. Best approaches in these areas, though, will vary greatly 
from country to country.   
 
Areas where it is obvious that progress can be made in furthering access in many 
developing countries a re i nstitutional infrastructure improvements.  B etter legal, 
information, payments systems, distribution and other infrastructures are needed in many 
countries.  The agendas of many governments, multilateral financial institutions and 
others are already aimed at this, but most of it will take time.  Other policy steps can be 
useful to further access.  The evidence of the main banking system suggests that one 
important way to enhance access is through improving competition in banking systems.  
This can be  done often easier than improving the institutional environment.  Also 
increasing competition and opening up can bring in (newer) technology and know-how.   
 
Increased competition can be applied to all segments. One can, for example, allow 
smaller and non-bank financial institutions greater access to existing networks.  In many 
countries, access to the payments system is limited to a club of large banks, or the pricing 
structure of access is such as to preclude smaller financial institutions from having 
effective access.  Information sharing is restricted in many countries to incumbent banks 
and formal financial institutions.  This and the limited existence of (private) credit 
bureaus in turn are hindering other financial institutions to provide financial services as 
evidence has shown (Miller, 2001).  Few countries, for example, allow non-bank 
financial institutions and entities, such as department stores, access to bank information, 
thereby making it more difficult for these entities to provide financial services to low-
income households.  Yet, from these non-financial institutions often lower-income people 
get their credit. In Mexico, for example, close to 50% of credit for those with no banking 
relationship comes from department stores (Solo, Caskey, and Durán, 2004). 
 
Although some of these changes are technically relatively easy to adopt, the area of 
competition policy remains very  complex, especially in small markets with little   20 
institutional capacity.  It requires establishing a credible competition agency, for which 
the institutional requirements are quite high.  Furthermore, even in well-developed 
countries, questions arise on how to deal with the many network properties in financial 
services (access to the payments system, credit bureau, distribution networks, etc).  
Answers here are not obvious.  One does not want to undermine the incentives for 
accurate information provision, for example, by opening up a credit bureau to any new 
party as that can undermine the incentive structure for entities to provide accurate 
information.  Nor does one want to have financial institutions disclose all type of 
information as that can undermine their willingness to enter relationships with their 
clients out of fear that competitors take away the business. 
 
In addition to the general view that competition can help with access, there is specific 
evidence that allowing greater entry by foreign banks can further enhance access.  
(General evidence on the effects of foreign bank entry is reviewed in Clarke et al. 2003). 
A study on  borrowers’ perceptions across 36 countries found that reported f inancing 
obstacles were lower in countries with high levels of foreign bank penetration (Clarke et 
al. 2004). The same study found strong evidence that even small enterprises benefited 
and no evidence that they were harmed by the presence of foreign banks.  The channels 
appear to be both competitive pressures of foreign banks on the domestic banking system, 
forcing local banks to go downscale, as well as direct provision of financial services by 
foreign banks.  A specific Latin America study found that foreign banks with small local 
presence do not appear to lend much to small businesses, but that large foreign banks in 
many cases surpass large domestic banks (Sanchez et al. 2002). 
 
There are also plenty of case examples on the effects of foreign banks’ entry.  In 
Mongolia, a country with an income per capita of less than $500 and a very rural based 
economy, after many years of operating deficits, loan losses, and a failed attempt at 
privatization, the government-owned Agricultural Bank of Mongolia (“Khan” Bank) was 
placed in receivership in 1999. In March 2003 HS Securities of Japan bought Khan Bank 
from the Government of Mongolia for $6.85 million. Khan Bank now operates a network 
with 379 points of service throughout Mongolia, much greater than any of the other 16   21 
banks operating in the country (and up from 269 when new management took office). 
One out of two Mongolian households today is a client of Khan Bank and it seems to 
continue to expand its branch network and services. 
 
The effects of foreign banks entry are both direct and indirect.  The direct effects include 
the direct provision of financial services mentioned above.  The indirect effects include 
the effects of foreign banks on the overall banking system through greater financial 
stability and improved efficiency of financial intermediation, as reviewed by Clarke et al. 
(2003).  These two effects can make the local banking environment more conducive to 
lending, including to the lower segments, and can put pressures on local banks to engage 
more in lending to lower segments as profitability in other segments, say in corporate 
sector lending, declines. 
 
The impact of foreign competition in securities markets on access is less obvious.  
Globalization has meant that large firms have been accessing international financial 
markets.  In some developing countries, domestic stock markets’ liquidity has 
consequently been negatively affected, possibly hurting access to finance by smaller 
firms.  At the same time, relaxing the financing constraints of large firms through access 
to international markets can help financing constraints of small firms since they indirectly 
benefit, such as through trade-credit type of arrangements. On net, it is not clear yet 
whether small firms lose or gain from globalization and increased competition in 
securities markets. 
 
Role of technological improvements 
 
Besides the removal of barriers and improvements in the institutional environment a 
number of recent country experiences have shown that by some specific interventions 
access can be enhanced.  In India, for example, discussions are underway to use existing 
networks (e.g., the postal system) to allow the delivery of new financial services by many 
other, public and private providers.  The idea is that the technology and information 
backbone of existing public or other networks need not be exclusively limited to one   22 
entity.  There is little reason, for example, why not to allow multiple financial services 
providers t o offer their products using the same distribution network and in the same 
outlets.  Many countries have large networks of post offices already connected and one 
could envision, for example, an electronic “kiosk” in every post-office where various 
financial institutions can offer their services online with the costumers to choose.  In the 
post offices in South Africa, using electronic-finance services, a platform in being 
developed to allow costumers to apply for loans from any bank.  Another model is Brazil, 
where the post office is present in 1,738 out of more than 5,000 municipalities without a 
bank outlet. Here the government auctioned the exclusive right to distribute financial 
services through post offices in 2001 and a large private bank was the winner.  Although 
this may quickly improve the quality of services, it does, however, carry some risks of 
local monopolies.  
 
New technology, including the internet, smart cards, and the use of mobile phones can in 
general help broaden access (see BIS, 2004, for a general overview of e -finance 
developments).  On one end of the income spectrum, in Vienna, payments for parking 
fees and in Finland payments at vending machines can be made by mobile phone. In 
many developed countries, mobile payments can now be made through voice access, text 
messaging (SMS) or WAP (as a gateway to the internet).  Another arrangement in 
developed countries allows customers to pay using the prepaid value stored on their 
mobile phone or to pay ex post, where payments for goods or services are placed as 
additional items on the customer’s phone bill.  Use of mobile phones for financial 
services provision might also facilitate access in lower-income, developing countries as 
mobile phones are often more widespread than fixed lines and can have a lower threshold 
for users than banks.  
 
In some developing and transition countries, banks have offered pre-paid cards (Bolivia, 
Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela).  The use of pre-paid cards can facilitate 
payment services for low-income households.  Often though, this will need regulatory 
changes, as when pre-paid cards are considered deposit instruments and fall under some   23 
form of banking regulation.  Technology can help in other ways. In Uganda, over the past 
two years, Hewlett-Packard and others active in the microfinance industry have been 
working to increase the scale of microfinance. The team has developed, tested and is 
implementing a remote transaction system using handheld devices, which capture 
transaction data and use a GSM network to transmit this back to a head office server and, 
in turn, management information system.  Hand-held tools are being used more generally 
by several micro-finance institutions t o provide on the spot loan applications and 
approvals (see Microsave.org for other examples). 
 
In Mexico, there have been innovative ways of trade finance using reverse factoring. The 
program developed by Nafin, a government development bank, allows many s mall 
suppliers to use their receivables from large credit-worthy buyers, including foreign 
MNCs, to receive working capital financing, effectively transferring their 
creditworthiness to allow small firms to access more and cheaper financing. What makes 
Nafin special is that it operates an internet-based platform, providing on-line services, 
reducing costs, increasing transparency and improving security. In the short-run, there is 
a subsidization of overhead costs, but by lowering costs for SME working capital, it 
expects to generate more business and become sustainable (see further Klapper, 2004).  
 
Paulson and McAndrews (1998) provide a case study of how Standard Bank of South 
Africa tried a new ways of addressing an un-banked population. Already a decade ago, in 
1993, Standard Bank set up E-Bank.  It was a simple savings product offering card-only 
access, but supported by dedicated staff speaking a mix of relevant local languages and 
operating out of dedicated outlets to help overcome problems of illiteracy and concerns 
about security in a high crime environment.  It had high start-up costs, but provided 
financial services to a low-income segment.  Since then E-bank has been absorbed in the 
bank’s more general provision of financial services to low-income households.   
 
These are examples of some specific market approaches and government interventions 
that can further enhance access.  Many other examples like these exist. More generally, 
there is much emphasis recently on  facilitating the mainstreaming of micro-finance   24 
institutions and the scaling up of new initiatives on access.  These initiatives can be done 
by specific interventions, as the above examples and work underway in India (see Basu et 
al. 2004, and Ananth and Mor, 2005) and other places shows, but how to generalize is 
still a lesson to be drawn.   
 
Government interventions to broaden access 
 
Universal usage, as will be clear by now, should not necessarily be a public policy goal 
and trying to broaden access too forcefully raises some concerns.  Access to credit may 
be a further problem when it leads to impoverishing indebtedness as poor can over-
borrow, often at unfavorable terms.  More generally, the fact that the poor and 
disenfranchised lack access may be more a problem of poverty than a problem of access.  
Although data are weak and do not allow one to make a definitive assessments, the share 
of those with potential “bankable” demand for financial services but no access in poorer 
developing economies may well be similar to the share of exclusion in richer advanced 
industrial economies.  Since there is evidence that access rises with per capita income and 
wealth, although with complex causality links, arguably the focus should primarily be on 
poverty-reducing growth and programs to enhance overall  inclusion (jobs, education, 
social participation), with greater access to financial services to follow as corollary.  And, 
even where there is a case to try to extend financial services provision to a larger 
segment, it can be that the costs of general, public or public-induced provision may 
outweigh its benefits.   
 
Broader public interventions can nevertheless be useful in some cases, but will need to be 
carefully introduced. Given political economy factors, broadening access may not relax 
credit and savings constraints, when there is a selection bias, i.e., those households or 
firms with good prospects anyway apply for credit.  Subsidies cannot only distort 
markets, but evidence is mounting that subsidies are captured by the relatively well off, 
which often already have access.  Priority lending requirements are neither the solution, 
but rather can also divert resources away from the lowest segments, often towards the 
less needed.   Furthermore, there may not be any additionality, as clients that have access   25 
already move to new providers that are being subsidized.   For example, much of 
emphasis on improving the supply of housing finance (by providing tax breaks, requiring 
minimum lending shares for commercial banks or establishing specialized financial 
institutions that rely on implicit government support) ends up being a subsidy for the 
middle-class.  In Brazil, for example, the cost of the housing finance program is one of 
the many factors behind the general high financial intermediation spreads, hurting 
borrowers and depositors through higher lending rates and lower deposit rates, 
presumably especially those less well off. Enhancing access can then in the end hurt 
those truly needed as the costs are borne by all.   
 
Another example relates to micro-finance institutions. Much emphasis has been given by 
donors and others, including multilateral financial institutions, to micro-finance 
institutions, including by providing subsidies for setting up institutions (sometimes also 
with providing subsidies for the continued costs of operating, but that has become less 
accepted in recent years).  These forms of subsidies can already work perversely as they 
can lead to higher subsequent spreads to recover the fixed costs (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998).  
There is thus a need to keep the direct and indirect subsidies minimal and for any 
program costs and risks co-sharing with the private sector is key as a (partial) market test. 
 
There is some evidence that the demand for and supply of financial services may be 
stimulated in other, less costly ways.  Many employers prefer to deposit their payroll and 
wages electronically, and would be willing to stimulate usage of formal bank services by 
providing some form of subsidy (for example, facilitating branching within the premises, 
encouraging the establishment of a credit union, or facilitating private savings schemes).  
Governments can also do this. They can, for example, try to make social security, tax and 
other individual-oriented payments in such a way so as to encourage more bank access, 
among others, by making them largely electronically.   
 
In 1999, the US Treasury Department, for example, initiated a program to pay all federal 
benefit payments, such as social security benefits, by Electronic Transfer Accounts 
(ETAs). One impediment was the large number of benefit recipients without bank   26 
accounts, whom cashed their checks instead of depositing them in a bank account.  Using 
subsidies, banks were encouraged to open bank accounts and recipients were encouraged 
to switch to electronic payments.  The Treasury offered to pay banks $12.60 for each 
ETA account they established for benefit recipients, and the Treasury specified a 
minimum set of characteristics that these accounts must meet (the accounts could not cost 
account owners more than $3 a month and they could not levy a fee for electronic 
deposits coming in). The switch would benefit the government as supplier (lower costs), 
but in the end could also help the recipient by giving him access to financial services.  In 
the end, the take-up was less than expected, suggesting again that lack of access to 
financial services is part of a broader issue of social exclusion.  Similar experiences exist 
with encouraging taxes payments and returns to be made electronically, where the usage 
is often concentrated among those already having access and otherwise better off.  
 
Besides these methods, there are other options open for governments to stimulate access 
for households to banking and other basic financial services. For one, the regulatory 
system can be used to direct, although not mandate banks to address the problem.  This is 
what might be described as the Community Reinvestment Act (RCA) model used in the 
US.  Second, authorities can mandate all banks to provide minimum banking services 
(“basic accounts”) for otherwise excluded segments of the market. Third, governments 
can rely on banks with a social commitment (in the legal form of either public banks, 
cooperatives, foundations, the postal network or proximity banks such as local savings 




The US Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) enacted by the US Congress in 1977 and 
revised in 1995 aims to improve financial access.  It aims to  help meet the credit 
requirements of the communities in which banks operate, including low to moderate 
income neighborhoods. Each bank is rated every three years as to the bank’s performance 
in making loans to low- and moderate-income people (rather than f or its process for 
complying with CRA), allowing the general public to apply pressures for non-
                                                 
6 The following sections draw extensively on Peachy and Roe, 2004.   27 
compliance.  Ratings focus on the areas of lending, services and investment, with lending 
carrying greater weight than the others. Claims for its success are contested but with 
neither side establishing a strong position; still a sign of success is that it has existed for a 
long time. The CRA model is very specific model though, not followed elsewhere, which 
suggest its replicability is limited. The CRA should moreover not be seen in isolation. 
 
The UK, France, Sweden and Ireland, among others, have tried by legal means to 
broaden access.  In France, for example, anyone seeking to open an account, but rejected 
by a bank, can contact the Bank of France who will provide a named bank (often the post 
bank) that will then be obligated to open an account for that person.  In some other 
countries, postal banks (often government owned) have been given the task to provide 
basic cash and banking services. There is little review of the experiences with these 
schemes, though, as to their effects and efficiency.  The experience with “proximity” 
banks is reviewed by Peach and Roe (2004) and some support is found for a positive 
effect on access of a greater presence of such banks.  Also, credit unions and other non-
for-profit financial institutions can make a difference in access.  
 
The experiences with credit extensions, especially for SMEs, are extensive, in both 
developed and developing countries, suggesting that there has been a large public need to 
provide these forms.  The efficacy of these interventions is much more doubtful, however 
(a general review of credit lines is World Bank, 2004; Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt 1997 
provide some empirical evidence on subsidies and review general experiences).  The 
means to distribute credit to these groups are generally distortive, often credit does not 
reach the intended target group but rather the well-connected, and institutional 
development is undermined, as banks do not develop their credit analysis skills. The case 
for direct and indirect intervention in access to credit is therefore less clear than for 
access to basic savings, payments and transaction services. 
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Conclusions   
 
Over the last decade, finance has been recognized as an important driver of economic 
growth.  More recently, access to financial services has been recognized as an important 
aspect of development and more emphasis is given to extending financial services to low-
income household segments. Although still early in the analysis, there is some evidence 
that access is improving. On the household side, there are some data on the use of micro-
finance that suggest there has been an expansion of access for households. Data here have 
to be interpreted carefully as increases may represent a better coverage over time, rather 
than an expansion.  There is also evidence in terms of more main-streaming of access by 
commercial banks as competition forces and technology allow them to go to the lower 
segments.  Examples in developing countries are ICICI bank, SHG Bank Linkage and 
South African banks that have made it a priority to reach out to lower segments.   
 
For firms, the evidence on access to credit is more mixed.  It appears to be increasing in 
some countries, but mostly in consumer finance forms, less so on the SME credit side. 
Some have argued that recent trends in banking systems may have adverse consequences.  
Consolidation of the banking system in many countries increases the distance between 
borrower and lender, making lending more based on hard information and reducing the 
role of relationship lending which can be especially useful for new and small firms.  Yet, 
part of this increased consolidation is the consequence of increased competition, which in 
general helps to increase access.  Indeed, while there is cross-country evidence that more 
concentrated banking systems could increase financing obstacles, this is more so if the 
system is not competitive and dominated by public banks.  
 
But more definite interpretation on factors affecting access will have to wait for better 
data on access.  This will require some national and international actions to develop more 
comparable data on access.  Data on access will have to come from different sources: 
providers of financial services provision (using national statistics and financial 
institutions), users of financial services (on the basis of surveys), and from experts (to 
identify constraints).  Each of these data sources has its tradeoffs, so simultaneous actions   29 
will be needed, but without good data, little progress can be made in terms of policy 
recommendations.  
 
With better data, benchmarking systems (across and over time) and m ore analysis on 
what is driving access will be possible. Furthermore, analysis of the success of different 
models, with possibly more controlled “experiments” and rigorous evaluations of (lack 
of) success is needed. This type of analysis will help both private financial institutions 
deliver financial services profitably as well as guide national and global  policy 
interventions.  It might also be useful for international and national agencies to develop 
“models”  on various aspects of access, i.e., advice on regulations of micro-finance 
institutions and their activities; and rules for some aspects such as consumer protection 
and Know Thy Customer rules; and guidance on the best data to collect, and who and 
how to collect data. 
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Armenia LSMS 1996 4920 17.13 8.86 0.203 4.51
Bosnia and Herzegovina LSMS 2001 5400 21.78 6.22 15.83
Bulgaria LSMS 2001 2633 5.43 5.43
China (Hebei andLiaoning) LSMS 1995 - 1997 787 82.47 41.93 13.34 28.08 5.21 24.65
Côte d'Ivoire LSMS 1988 1600 88.13 24.81 23.81 3.19 21.06
Ghana LSMS 1998/99 5998 11.97 39.08 3.27 32.03
Guatemala LSMS 2000 7276 18.13 17.77 0.38 31.75 23.47 7.42
Guyana LSMS 1992/93 1819 15.67 13.74 3.63 4.67 1.32 2.53
Jamaica LSMS 1997 2020 68.12 59.41 17.82 10.54 1.88 5.89
Kyrgyz Republic LSMS 1998 2979 11.35 1.34 10.14 6.08 0.34 5.3
Morocco LSMS 1990-91 3323 15.53 22.03 3.55 19.32
Nepal LSMS 1996 3373 57.04 12.93 49.96
Nicaragua LSMS 1998-99 4209 6.53 4.73 0.19 22.52 7.58 7.75
Pakistan LSMS 1991 4800 23.58 12.21 14.52 30.31 1.1 29.42
Panama LSMS 1997 4945 1.52 0.83 0.79
Peru LSMS 1994 3623 25.23 16.64 2.07 14.52
Romania LSMS 1994-95 24560 94.28 22.53 1.36 15.88 6 11.41
South Africa LSMS 1993 9000 44.76 4.94 42.58
Viet Nam LSMS 1997-98 6002 89.85 8.7 12.81 49.1 26.12 30.44
Brazil (11 urban areas) SAFS 2002 2000 42.7 45.45
Colombia (Bogota city) 41.2
India AIDIS 1991 57031 26.9 11.8 19
India (UP and AP) RFAS 2003 6000 47.5
Mexico (Mexico city) 25
Botswana FINSCOPE 2003 530 46.98 25.66 11.70 29.06
Lesotho FINSCOPE 2003 534 17.04 11.05 5.99
Namibia FINSCOPE 2003 810 28.40 0.86 5.31 15.19
Swaziland FINSCOPE 2003 604 35.26 19.54 4.14 16.06
South Africa FINSCOPE 2004 2988 46
Kenya Estimate 10.00
Tanzania Estimate 5.00
Uganda Estimate < 5



















Source: Kumar et al. 2004 
 
Table 3: Why Don’t the Unbanked Use Banks? 
 
 
Source: Kumar et al. 2004
4% 1% 1% 1% Others
n.a. 4% Family/Friends
2% n.a. Post Office
14% 7% 0% Cooperatives
96% 85% 90%






Mexico Colombia India Brazil Distribution of Deposits
4% 1% 1% 1% Others
n.a. 4% Family/Friends
2% n.a. Post Office
14% 7% 0% Cooperatives
96% 85% 90%
































§Demand limitations: no need/no savings
No awareness
§Supply limitations: Bank barriers/

































§Demand limitations: no need/no savings
No awareness
§Supply limitations: Bank barriers/





§Inconvenience –Location and hours
§Other Reasons
Brazil Colombia USA*  37 
Table 4: Who Are the Unbanked? USA and Mexico 
 
Similarities 
Lower income groups  
Below median income  
USA                                         79% 
Mexico                            90%     
Less educated 
Less than high school 
USA                                          56%  
Mexico                                      51%  
Marginalized in socio-economic terms 
Mexico (informal sector)              60% 
USA (Latino and Afro American)    90% 
 
Differences 
Percentage of Unbanked 
Mexico (Mexico City)                    75% 
USA                                            9.1% 
Home Ownership of Unbanked 
Mexico (own home in Mexico City)  63%  
USA                                             7.8%  
 
Source: Solo et al. 2004 
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Table 5: Complaints by Firms About Lack of Access to External Financing  












Albania 2002 14.29 16.04 14.81 0
Algeria 2002 53.07 55.84 45.36 44
Armenia 2002 21.82 22.95 19.05 18.18
Azerbaijan 2002 13.04 12.61 24 4.17
Bangladesh 2002 41.59 42.47 45.81 36.36
Belarus 2002 25.83 30.67 12.5 18.92
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 22.5 23.16 19.44 25
Brazil 2003 60.46 61.94 60.63 51.85
Bulgaria 2002 38.52 45.24 18.42 29.73
Cambodia 2003 9.39 9.33 5.26 12.2
China 2002 22.8 16.87 20.86 30.18
Croatia 2002 24.86 26.89 24.24 19.23
Czech Republic 2002 25.1 28.83 25.58 6.98
Ecuador 2003 44.9 48.96 36.04 50
El Salvador 2003 30.97 36.54 19.64 19.51
Eritrea 2002 52.31 55 52.63 33.33
Estonia 2002 12.1 11.82 16.67 9.09
Ethiopia 2002 42.82 43.48 48 27.91
Georgia 2002 10.47 10.08 15.38 5.88
Guatemala 2003 34.07 36.36 33.33 22
Honduras 2003 50.79 56.19 51.43 20.69
Hungary 2002 21.63 26.06 16.67 9.52
India 2002 18.3 .. .. ..
Indonesia 2003 17.53 15.98 16.59 19.47
Kazakhstan 2002 11.69 9.88 11.43 20.59
Kenya 2003 44.07 60.47 30.59 39.29
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 15.98 15.09 20.45 5.88
Latvia 2002 6.06 5.22 4.17 12
Lithuania 2002 6.67 5.69 12.12 4.55
Macedonia, FYR 2002 13.33 13.21 8.7 22.22
Moldova 2002 25.15 27.12 15.15 30
Nicaragua 2003 54.42 57.18 47.17 12.5
Pakistan 2002 37.55 38.56 34.57 27.5
Peru 2002 50.22 50.65 62.5 66.67
Philippines 2003 13.52 15.04 14.39 8.86
Poland 2002 32.7 36.45 22.64 32.2
Romania 2002 29.72 32.89 25.4 24.32
Russian Federation 2002 20.26 20.95 17.98 20.69
Serbia and Montenegro 2001 33.58 30.77 33.33 42.86
Slovak Republic 2002 29.56 32.67 27.27 20.83
Slovenia 2002 8.15 9.93 4 0
Tajikistan 2002 22.54 24.51 15.56 25
Tanzania 2003 48.33 54.76 38.24 27.27
Turkey 2002 17.33 16.07 25.71 9.84
Uganda 2003 45.04 47.32 39.02 33.33
Ukraine 2002 26.42 31.06 16.25 18.18
Uzbekistan 2002 26.53 26.04 21.43 35.29
Zambia 2002 53.66 65.15 51.58 37.14
Description: Percentage of firms that say access to 
financing presents major or severe obstacles to the 
operation and growth of their business.
Indicator - Access to financing
Country Year
Country 
Average